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address? climate? change? depends? on? its? economic,? institutional,? structural? and? cultural?
capacities.?The? European?Union,? in? contrast,? considers? only? economic?wealth? of? a?Member?
State? as? a? criterion? for? the? planned?EU?Effort? Sharing?Decision?within? the?EU?Climate? and?
Energy?Package.?In?order?to?assess?recent?climate?policy?instruments?of?EU?Member?States?it?is?
crucial?to?take?a?variety?of?national?capacities?into?account.?This?article?raises?the?question?of?




environmental? movement? by? political? parties? is? seen? as? a? major? explanatory? factor? for?
differences?among?the?countries’?effort?in?climate?policy?legislation.?Constitutional?factors?like?
the? number? of? veto? players? mediate? parties’? influence? on? the? national? effort? of? climate?
mitigation.?A? cluster? analysis,?on? the?other?hand,? reveals? similarities?within? and?differences?
between? national? climate? policy? strategies? of? certain? country? clusters.? Differences? in? the?
character?of?national?climate?policy? strategies?are?explained?by? structural?economic? changes?
(privatization)?and?institutional?affinities?(styles?of?regulation).?Relying?on?combined?data?from?
the?Comparative?Manifesto?Project,?the?Comparative?Political?Dataset?and?climate?policy?data?
from? the? International? Energy? Agency,? both? issues? are? examined? using? pooled? time?series?
cross?sectional?analysis?for?EU?25?countries?in?1990?2008.?
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Convention?on?Climate?Change? in? 1992?and?the?Kyoto?Protocol? in? 1997.?The?success?of?these?
international? agreements,? however,? depends? on? the? development? and? implementation? of?
concrete?policies? in? individual?countries.?This?ongoing?process? is?rather?advanced?within? the?
European?region.?Partly,?this?is?due?to?the?implementation?of?the?EU?Emission?Trading?Scheme?
(ETS),? a? climate?policy?which? is? regulated? at? the?European? level.?Yet,? sectors?which? are?not?
specified?by?the?ETS?such?as?transport,?housing,?and?promotion?of?renewable?energy?usage?will?
be?crucial?for?the?achievement?of?the?agreed?reduction?of?greenhouse?gas?(GHG)?within?the?EU?
Climate? and?Energy?package? starting? 2012.?Since? these? sections? are? regulated?within? the?EU?
Effort? Sharing? Decision? which? specifies? only? national? targets? (No.? 406/2009/EC)? and? not?
detailed?prescriptions?for?policy?instruments,?we?observe?substantial?variation?in?the?regulatory?




varying? capacities? in? implementing? climate? policies? are? one? major? source? for? national?
differences? in? GHG? reduction? efforts? and? strategies? (Burch? and? Robinson? 2007;?Winkler,?
Baumert,? Blanchard,? Burch,? and? Robinson? 2007).? Capacity? theory? understands? national?
capacities?for?policy?change?to?be?based?on?domestic?political?institutions?as?well?as?structural?
and? cultural?properties.?This? approach? is?partly? realized?by? the?EU?ESD?where?EU?Member?
States?follow?binding?reduction?targets?according?to?their?economic?capacities.?However,?this?
paper?follows?an?interpretation?of?national?capacities?going?beyond?economic?strength?(e.g.?as?
GDP? per? capita)? but? including? institutional,? structural? and? organizational? factors? resulting?




or?negatively? influences? the?articulation?of? special? interests? for?environmental? issues?and,? in?
consequence,? the? political? willingness? for? certain? policy? instruments? of? GHG? mitigation?
(Winkler? et? al.? 2007).?Concerning? socio?technological? resources,? it? is?not?only? the? technical?
advancement? and? educational? capacity? within? the? state? which? contributes? to? the?





styles? of? regulation? and? varieties? in? business?labor? relations,? the? production? regime,? the?
welfare?state?or?the?general? level?of?privatization.?Apart?from?national?motivation? induced?by?
top?down?governance?of?EU?regulations?in?the?domestic?business?sector?and?independent?from?
national?emission? levels?or?economic? factors,?these? institutional?and?organizational?resources?
are? supposed? to? strongly? influence? national? regulations? on? climate? change? (Haddad? 2005;?
Winkler?et?al.?2007).??
Following? this? argument,?more? general,? but? theoretically? elaborated? approaches? to?
analyze?the?development?of?domestic?mitigation?policies? for?climate?change?(CC)?are?applied?
(Esping?Andersen? 1998b;?Gough,?Meadowcroft,?Dryzek,?Gerhards,?Lengfeld,?Markandya,?and?
Ortiz? 2008;? Knill,? Debus,? and? Heichel? 2009;? Poloni?Staudinger? 2008;? Vogel? 2003).?
Furthermore,? European?Member? States? differ? not? only? in? their? political? agreement? towards?
GHG?reduction?and?number?of?national?regulations?as?it?is?institutionalized?in?the?EU?ESD,?but?
also? in? their? variety? of? instruments? ranging? from? ecological? standards? of? production? or?
incentive?based? instruments? to? voluntary? agreements? and? education? (Fiddaman? 2007;?
Stephenson? and? Boston? 2010;? Strachan,? Foxon,? and? Fujino? 2008).? Therefore,? qualitative?
differences? in? national? strategies? of? GHG?mitigation? within? the? EU? 25?Member? States? are?
considered?and?explicitly?investigated?in?this?research?paper.?In?the?first?section,?I?outline?how?
political? power? resources? influence? party? interests? in? climate? policies.? The? veto?player?
approach?and?patterns?of?democracy?as?institutional?capacities?are?applied?to?the?specific?topic?
of?climate?policies?in?Section?2.?It?is?demonstrated?that?increasing?the?number?of?access?points?
for? environmental? interests? in? a? country? also? increases? the? political? support? for? climate?
instruments.? Section? 3? extends? the? investigation? from? the? general? effort? to? the? diversity? of?
climate?policies?within?EU?Member?States.?It? is?argued?that?countries?follow?national?specific?
pathways?when? implementing?certain?climate?policy? instruments.?The? following?section?then?







1? Climate? policy? and? capacity? by? political? representation:? the? power? resource?
approach?
Policy?refers?to?the?substantive?dimension?of?political?action.?The? formulation?of?policies?can?
be? done? by? institutional? and/or? non?institutional? actors.? Since? climate? policies? are?mainly?
implemented? through? the? political? sphere,? I? use? the? term? policies? in? a? rather? narrow? sense?
referring? only? to? public? state? actions? by? actors? like? national? governments? and? public?
institutions.?Climate?policy?then?refers?to?a?policy?whose?content?are?the?regulations?towards?
CC?implemented?merely?by?public?actors?(Schmidt?1995).?Based?on?existing?empirical?studies,?I?
expect? substantial?variation?both? in? the?effort?and? the?character?of?climate?policies?between?




Santarius? 2007;? Conca? 2005;? David,? Raustiala,? and? Skolnikoff? 1998).? As? a? result,? national?
policies? for? reducing?CC?heavily?depend?on?existing? institutions?and? social? structure?of?each?
country?(Eckersley?2006;?Jahn?1998).??
In?order?to?explain?these?differences?in?the?national?effort?in?climate?policies,?I?follow?a?
theoretical? argument?which? serves? to? describe? the? expansion? of? general? interests? in? public?
policies?as?a?result?of?political?conflicts?between?social?classes?and?the?distribution?of?political?
power:?the?power?resource?approach?(Esping?Andersen?1993a;?Esping?Andersen?1993b;?Gough?
1979;?Korpi? 1989;?Korpi? 1983;?Korpi? 1985).?This? approach? is? very? prominent? in?welfare? state?
research?but?will?be?used?as?an?analogy?in?order?to?illustrate?the?expansion?of?a?public?interest?
for?climate?policies.?In?the?context?of?social?policy?expansion,?political?parties?and?trade?unions?
have? been? the? central? power?resource? for? the?working? class? in? order? to? implement? policies?
which? serve? the? workers’? interests.? Hence,? strong? left? parties? represent? an? opportunity?
structure? for? labor? interests?which?allows?strong?redistributive?welfare?policies.?Applying?this?
approach? to? the?context?of?climate?change,? it? is? the?(new)?middle?class?which?mainly?has?an?
interest? in? climate? policies? (Gelissen? 2007;?Markham? 2008).? I? assume? that? this? interest? in?
environmental?issues?is?most?successfully?addressed?in?countries?with?parties?that?put?the?topic?
of?CC?on?the?political?agenda.?The?higher?the?emphasis?on?environmental?issues?on?the?parties’?
agenda? is,? and? the?more? successful? these?parties? in?national? elections? are,? the?higher? is? the?






Following? the? argument? of? the? power?resource? approach,? political? parties?may? also?
serve?to?explain?the?postulated?correlative?relationship?between?the?(social?democratic)?welfare?
state?and?the?amount?of?implemented?climate?policies?as?it?is?outlined?by?Recchia?(2002)?and?
Dryzek? (2008).?Political?parties?are? the? relevant?actors? for?both? the?historical?expansion?and?
maintenance?of?the?welfare?state,?and?the?implementation?of?climate?policies.?The?correlative?
relationship?between?welfare?state?and?climate?policies?may?be?spurious?in?the?sense?that?it?is?
generated? by? the? same? power?resource,? so? to? say,? the? same? political? party? or? party? family.?
Recent? studies,? for? example,? show? that? welfare? state? services? are? cut? significantly? less? in?




In? relation? to? climate?policies,? the? ideological?orientation?of? the?parties? that? support?
environmental?issues?does?not?per?se?play?an?important?role?as?long?as?there?is?enough?general?
electoral? support?and?a? strong?emphasis?on? the?environmental? issue?by? these?parties.?Let?us?
briefly?assume?that?all?parties?in?parliament?emphasize?environmental?issues?equally?and?gain?
the? same? electoral? support.?Differences?between?party? families? then?would? account?only? for?
differences? in?the?type?of?climate?policy?strategy?that?would?be? implemented.?Nuclear?power?
production,?for?instance,?could?be?framed?as?a?climate?friendly?energy?source?by?economically?
liberal?parties,?whereas?green?parties?would? strongly? reject? this? interpretation.?However,? the?
weighting?of?pro?environmental?issues?embraced?in?the?parties’?agenda?is?expected?to?be?very?
different?according?to?the?ideological?orientation?or?party?family.?Economically?liberal?parties,?







of?environmental?protection?of? the?parties? in? the?cabinet? is?high? (Knill,?Debus,?and?Heichel?
2009).?
The? underlying? mechanisms? which? explain? why? a? political? party? stresses? issues? of?
environmental? protection? can? be? very? different.? It? is? argued,? for? instance,? that? left? parties?






1998;? Klitschelt? 1993;? Markham? 2008;? McCormick? 1998;? Neumayer? 2004;? 2003).? A? related?
argument? concerns? strategic? coalitions? with? environmental? movements? or? economic?
associations?on?the?one?side?and?political?parties?on?the?other?side.?Environmental?movements?
usually?build? coalitions?with? green?parties? (Müller?Rommel? and?Poguntke? 2002;?Richardson?
and?Roots?1995).?Green?parties?have?the?advantage?of?a?strong?environmental?focus,?but?often?
lack?political?power.?Therefore,?environmental?movements?also?seek?relations?with?left?parties,?
such?as? the?social?democrats,?which?often?have?more?political?power,?but?a? lower? interest? in?
environmental? issues,?particularly?when?traditional?working?class?related? interests?are?also?at?
stake? (Kriesi,?Koopmans,?Duyvendak,? and?Giugni? 1992).?Economically? liberal?parties,?on? the?
other?hand,?mainly?represent?business? interests?and?support?climate?policies?especially?when?
this?serves?to?increase?the?national?economy’s?status?in?international?competition?due?to?new?
energy?efficient? technologies.? Additionally,? left? parties? also? prefer? institutional? solutions? to?
social?problems.?Therefore,?we? can? expect? that? left?wing?governments? act? earlier? and?prefer?
more? institutional?solutions,?such?as?the?creation?of?a?ministry?of?environment,?compared?to?
governments? consisting? of? other? party? constellations? (Evans? 1999;? Jahn? 1998;? King? and?
Borchardt?1994;?Neumayer?2004;?2003).?
Summing?up,?climate?policies?are?more?likely?in?countries?where?parties?with?a?strong?
interest? in? the? environment? are? part? of? the? parliament? and/or? a? government? coalition.?
Moreover,? the? selected? policy? instruments?will? differ? according? to? the? strength? of? different?
parties? since? their? ideology? leads? to? different? forms? of? regulation? and? interests? in? different?
policy? sectors.?As? a? result,? political? power? resources? are? expected? to? affect? both? the? overall?






2? Climate? policy? and? institutional? capacity? of? decision? making:? Patterns? of?
Democracy?and?Veto?Players?
Power? resource?approaches?are?useful?because? they?draw?our?attention? to? the? importance?of?
political?actors?and?their?relative?power?as?national?capacities?in?the?decision?making?process.?
But? it? is? also? important? to? note? that? these? actors? are? embedded? in? typical? institutional?
structures? that? enable? and? restrict? distinct? political? action? and,? thus,? serve? as? institutional?
capacities? in? order? to? reduce? GHG? emissions? (Immergut? 1994;? Peters? 1999).? The? political?
system,?for?instance,?influences?the?number?of?parties?and,?therefore,?the?relative?significance?













allow? fast? decision?making? processes? and? are? more? affected? by? special? interest? groups’?
lobbying.?Due? to?a?higher?number?of?veto?points? in? the?consensus?oriented?system,?political?
decision?making? is? more? time?consuming,? but? includes? also? diffuse? group? interests? like?
environmental?ones.?Consequently,?it?should?allow?implementing?more?climate?policies.?
Lijphart’s? (1999)? concept? of? majoritarian? and? consensus? democracies? was? mainly?



















chambers? in? a?bicameral?political? system? are? counted? as? a? separate? veto?power?only? if? they?
differ?in?their?ideological?majority.?On?partisan?level,?parties?in?coalition?governments?are?only?
seen? as? separate? veto?players? if? they? are?positioned?on? the? extreme?poles?of? the? ideological?
spectrum?or?of?specific?preference?extremes.?
Following?Tsebelis? (1995;? 1999;?2004;?2002)?means? to?assume?a?negative?effect?of? the?
number?of?access?points?(veto?players)?in?the?political?decision?making?process.?Since?Lijphart’s?
(1984;? 1999)? classification? of? consensus? democracies? is? characterized? by? a? high? number? of?
access?points,? these?countries?should? implement? less?climate?policies? than? their?majoritarian?
counterparts.?The?openness?of? the?political?system? towards? lobby?groups?of?special? interests,?
however,?does?not?per?se?mean?a?negative? impact?on?the? implementation?of?climate?policies,?
but? it? depends? on? the? character? of? the? interest.? Tsebelis? understands? veto? players? as? a?
constraint?towards?processes?of?political?change?because?oppositional?interest?may?have?more?
opportunities? in? order? to? gain? influence? on? the? process? of? policy?making.? However,? high?
number? of? access? points? can? also? be? understood? as? a? chance? to? counter?balance? foremost?
dominant? lobbying? groups? and? to? enable? new? interests? to? influence? the? process? of? policy?
making.?Multi?level? governance? and? corporatist? structures,? for? example,? allow? a? consensus?
based? informational? policy? and? also? include? public? and? non?governmental? actors? in? the?
political?decision?making?processes?(Crepaz?1995;?Lundqvist?2001;?Scruggs?2001;?Scruggs?1999;?
Wälti?2004).?On?the?one?hand,?climate?policies,?broad?forward?by?green?parties?in?parliament,?
are? more? likely? to? be? rejected? by? economic? interests? groups,? if? they? benefit? from? higher?
numbers? of? access? points.? On? the? other? hand,? these? access? points,? may? also? serve?
environmental?actors?to?influence?decisions?about?economically?beneficial?but?environmentally?
disastrous?policies.?So,? the?number?of?access?points? is?positively?related? to?climate?policies? if?
there? is?a?strong?environmental? lobby?which?makes?use?of?them.?Environmental?movements,?
therefore,?are?capable?to?counter?balance?the?strong?influence?of?economic?interest?on?political?





access?points? to? the?political? sphere? (Eckersley? 2006;?Goldstone? 2003;?Kitschelt? 1986;?Kriesi,?











(Winkler? et? al.? 2007).? I? argue? that?beyond? the?quantitative?number?of? climate?policies,? it? is?
important? to? consider? national? differences? in? the? qualitative? choice? of? specific? policy?
instruments.?Countries?with?equally?high?efforts?in?GHG?mitigation?may?choose?very?different?
pathways? of? climate? mitigation.? These? pathways? derive? from? differences? in? historical?
trajectories?and?priorities?for?specific?policy?forms,?for?example,?for?market?based?instruments?
and?against?administrative?regulation.?As?Burch?&?Robinson?(2007)?state,?[…]?response?capacity?
is?much?more? easily?mobilized? for? forms? of? adaptive? or?mitigative? responses? that? reflect? such?
priorities? (e.g.?market?based? instruments)? than? for? forms? of? response? characterized? by?more?
traditional?command?and?control?policies? (p.?331).?Consequently,? I?expect?variation? in?climate?





the? historical? institutionalism? theory.? In? general,? historical? institutionalism? assumes? that?
political?choices?on?institutions?that?are?constituted?in?one?point?in?time?predetermine?future?
political?obligations?and?decisions.?This?early?political?agreement?for?one?specific?idea?becomes?





policies?rarely?result? in?different?but?the?traditional?policy?pathway?as? it? is?demonstrated,? for?
example,?by?Duit?(2007)?for?the?special?case?of?Swedish?emission?control.?Following?this?line?of?
argument,?traditional?but?stable?political?institutions?should?also?affect?new?policy?fields?with?
respect? to? general? public? interests? and? political? preferences? for? specific? policy? instruments.?
Thus,?apart?from?policy?diffusion?through?international?regulations?across?countries?(Albrecht?







On? the? one? hand,? this? transfer? derives? from? common? interests? for? specific? policy?
instruments,? which? are? equal? in? both? the? origin? and? the? new? policy? domain.? As? it? was?
discussed? in? Chapter? 1,? political? institutions? derive?mainly? from? power? constellations? and?
general? interests.?Thus,?cross?national?differences,? for?example,? in?welfare? institutions?can?be?
interpreted?as?a?consequence?of?traditional?social?cleavages?and?power?constellations?of?certain?
socio?economic?groups?within?the?European?Member?States?(e.g.?van?Kersbergen?and?Manow?
2009).? I?argue? that? the?welfare?state?also?creates?a?special? interest? in?climate?policies?among?
these?socio?economic?groups?in?two?ways.?First,?social?security?arrangements?restructure?social?
and?economic?conditions?by?reducing?poverty?(e.g.?through?income?maintenance?in?situations?
of? risk)? and? income? equality? (e.g.? through? income? redistribution? through? taxation)? (Esping?
Andersen?1998a;?2002).?The?welfare?state?further?provides?access?to?extended?health,?child?care?
and? elderly? services? and,? therefore,? creates? new? social? status? positions? through? increased?
employment? in? the? (public/private)? service? sector.? Despite? this? universal? trends,? Esping?
Andersen?(1990;?1998a)?showed?that?depending?on?the?institutional?setup?of?the?welfare?state,?
countries? show? differences? in? poverty? and? equality? outcomes? which? are? low? for? social?
democratic? and? high? for? liberal?welfare? regimes.? Following? this? line? of? argument,? national?
arrangements?of?the?welfare?state?influence?a?person’s?general?value?orientation?and?objective?
preference? structure? according? to? their? emphasis? on? redistribution,? status?maintenance? and?
the? extension? of? the? service? sector.? Since? policies? are? rarely?made? in? absence? of? electoral?
support,?because?policy?makers?have?an?electoral? incentive? to? follow?public?opinion? in? their?
decision?making,?these?interests?play?a?major?role?for?the?implementation?of?national?climate?
policies?(Burstein? 1998;?Marquart?Pyatt?2007;?Tanguay,?Lanoie,?and?Moreau?2004).? It? is?most?
likely? that? these? special? interests? represented? and?maintained?by? the? institutional? setting?of?
social?policy?also? influence?the?character?of?climate?policies? in?order?to?serve? interest?groups’?
benefit.?
On? the?other?hand,?welfare?regimes?are?characterized?by?differences? in? their?styles?of?
regulation.? The? Social? Democratic? regime,? for? example,? relies? on? a? more? universalistic?
character?which? provides? equal? benefits? for? all? income? groups? and? is?mainly? tax? financed.?
Consequently,? I? expect? these? countries? also? to? favor? climate? policy? instruments? which? are?
under?the?responsibility?of?public?authorities.?In?contrast,?countries?of?the?Conservative?regime?
outsource? contribution?based? social? policy? instruments? to? social? insurance? systems? and? are?






in? a? Liberal? regime,? or? whether? social? policy? follows? a? politics? against? markets? approach?
(Ebbinghaus?and?Manow?2001).?This?dimension?is?conceptualized?as?(de?)?commodification?by?
Esping?Andersen? (1990).? Labor?market? regulations,? for? example,? are? either?more? passively,?
oriented? toward?means?testing? social? security,?or?more?actively,? involved? in? labor?market?by?
employment?stimulation?policies?and?labor?protection.?Accordingly,?climate?policies?might?be?
implemented? either? more? actively? taking? labor? market? stimulation? or? social? impacts? into?
account,?or?they?follow?a?more?passive?logic?of?markets.?
Both? the? degree? of? political? involvement? (external? vs.? internal? solutions)? and? a?
country’s? preferences? for? or? against?market?based? instruments? highly? influence? a? country’s?
political?abilities?and?power?to?implement?specific?climate?policies?in?all?relevant?sectors.?Vogel?
(2003),? for? example,? argues? that? the? institutionally? powerful? British? government? is? sharply?
limited? by? its? informal? approach? to? enforcement? and?minimal? use? of? prosecution? against?
environmentally?negative?businesses.?In?contrast,?the?French?government?does?have?a?variety?of?
instruments?at? its?disposal?by?which? it? can?both? shape? the?direction?of? industrial?activity?and?
minimize? access? to? the? political? process? by? various? nonindustrial? constituencies,? particularly?
organized? labor? and? middle?class? pressure? groups? (Vogel? 2003:? 287).? Thus,? focusing? on?
institutional?variation?only?is?misleading?since?informal?access?and?enforcement?practice?might?
be? of?major? importance? underneath? official? government?business? regulations.? Comparative?
analysis,?for?example,?concerning?water?pollution?of?the?Rhine?in?Europe?and?the?Great?Lakes?







These? findings? suggest?a?more?holistic?approach?which? includes?national?variation? in?
the?production?regime?and?level?of?privatization.?Following?the?varieties?of?capitalism?approach?
(Hall? and? Soskice? 2001),? variation? across? countries? in? production? regimes? at? the? end? of? the?
1980s? and? in? the? first? half? of? the? 1990s? fall? into? one? of? two?main? patterns.? Countries? like?







coordination? between? companies? is?weak? in? liberal?market? economies? such? as? the?UK? and?
Ireland.? Since? climate? policies? mainly? affect? business? companies,? these? differences? in? the?
business?public?administration?relationship?is?crucial?for?explaining?variations?in?the?character?
of?national?instruments?of?emission?reduction.?One?link?between?climate?policies?and?business?
patterns? is? political? influence.?As?Callaghan? (2009)? states,? varieties? of? capitalism? and,?more?





weak? and? limited? to? only? framework? policies? in? the? further? regime? whereas? public?
administration? allows? all? levels? of? intervention? concerning? service? provision,? regulation? and?
financing? in? the? latter? regime? (Obinger? and? Zohlnhöfer? 2005).? Thus,? governments? in?
uncoordinated? regimes?with?higher? levels?of?privatization?simply? lack?political? influence?and?





owned? enterprises? (low)? (Obinger? and? Zohlnhöfer? 2005).? Consequently,? the? level? of?
privatization,? I? argue,? is? the? necessary? consequence? of? all? other? factors?mentioned? in? this?
research?paper.??
Summing?up,?I?argue?that?differences?in?the?character?of?climate?policy?strategies?result?
from? institutional?pathways?of?welfare? state?development,?varieties?of?capitalism? in?business?
regulations? or,? more? directly,? through? levels? of? privatization.? These? factors? either? shape?
political? electoral? support? through? general? interests? for? specific? policies? among? the? general?








The? analysis? of? this? paper? is? based? on? country?specific? data? for? EU? 25? Member? States?
(excluding?Malta? and? Cyprus? due? to? lack? of? data? availability)? from? 1990?2007.? In? order? to?
categorize?climate?policies?as?the?dependent?variable,?I?use?data?from?the?International?Energy?
Agency? for? 1991?2007? which? provides? databases? for? all? national? programs? to? CC,? energy?
efficiency? and? renewable? energy.? The? first? step? of? the? analyses? applies? a? measure? of? the?
cumulative?number? of? climate?policies?per? year? implemented? in? each? country?which? allows?
investigating? the?national? effort?of?mitigating?GHG? emissions.? Since?policies? follow?political?
decision? making? with? a? delay,? I? include? a? one? year? gap? between? political? institutions/?
indicators?of?cabinet?orientation?and?climate?policies.?Climate?policies?are?further?categorized?
according? to? the? International? Energy? Agency? categories? (see? Table? 1? for? a? detailed?
description).? The? basis? for? the? cluster? analysis? represents? the? number? of? policies? for? each?
category?implemented?by?the?EU?Member?States?until?2005?and?2008?respectively.?
As?independent?variables,?political?macro?indicators?and?indicators?on?party?orientation?
are? derived? from? the? Comparative?Manifesto? Project? (Klingemann,? Hofferbert,? and? Budge?
2006)? including? political? left?right? calculations? of? Franzmann? and? Kaiser? (2006)? and? own?
calculations? for?environmental? issues?Unfortunately,? the?dataset?only?provides?one? indicator?
for?measuring? the?environmental?orientation?of?political?parties.?Political?orientations?of? the?
cabinet?are?proportionally?weighted?by?the?party’s?cabinet?strength?and?are?summed?across?all?
cabinet? parties.? Political? institutions? are? based? on? the? Comparative? Political? Dataset? III?
(Armingeon,?Careja,?Potolidis,?Gerber,?and?Leimgruber?2008).?The?dataset?provides?seven?out?
of?ten? indicators?of?Lijphart’s?executive?disproportionality?and?veto?player? index.?The?effective?
number? of? parties? in? parliament,? the? legislative?executive? relationship? (dominant? vs.?
balanced),?the?elective?system?(majority?vs.?proportional)?and?the?executive?form?(one?party?vs.?
multi?party? coalition? cabinet)? serve? to? build? an? additive? index? of? Lijpharts’? dimension? of?
executive? disproportionality? (1984;? 1999).?The? veto? player? index? is? constructed? as? the? sum?of?
federalism,?judicative?control?and?the?form?of?legislative?which?were?scaled?between?zero?and?
one.?This?operationalization?is?leaned?on?Tsebelis’?(1995;?1999;?2004;?2002)?approach.?However,?












Due? to? the? longitudinal? structure? of? the? data,? pooled? cross?sectional? time?series?
regression?models?are?applied? in?order? to? investigate? the? influence?of? institutional?capacities?
and?political?preferences?of?the?national?cabinet?on?the?number?of?climate?policies?in?the?first?
step.?Since?climate?policies?are?count?for?each?year?and?country,?a?Poisson?distribution?should?
be? assumed.?The? analysis? is? therefore?based?on?Poisson?models? including? year?dummies.? In?
order?to?control?for?robustness?of?the?results,?they?are?compared?to?an?ordinary? least?squares?
estimation?with?panel?corrected?standard?errors?(Kmenta?1997).?




cluster? solution?will? be? discussed? in? the? following? section? and? is? shown? in?Appendix? 1? and?
Appendix?2.?The?countries? that?have?not? implemented?climate?policies? so? far?were?excluded?
from? the? cluster? analysis.? The? results? constitute? the? dependent? variable? which? clusters?
countries? into? climate?policy? regimes? and?will?be? applied? in? further? analysis? concerning? the?
influence? of? national? levels? of? privatization,? welfare? state? institutions,? national? styles? of?








environmental?protection,? left?orientation?of? the? cabinet?parties,?and? institutional? capacities?
allowing?general?environmental?interest?to?enter?the?political?arena?through?a?higher?number?
of?access?points.?Table?2? shows? the? results?of? the?pooled? cross?sectional? time?series?analysis?
using? two?different? approaches? (Poisson? vs.?panel?corrected? standard? errors?OLS).?Basically,?
both?methods?indicate?identical?results?indicating?the?robustness?of?the?estimated?effects.??
***Table?2?about?here***?
The? basic? aim? of? this? research? paper? is? to? identify? national? capacities? beyond?
economical?strength?measured?in?GDP?as?it?is?applied?within?the?EU?ESD.?The?analyses?control?
for?economic?factors?using?GDP?per?capita?in?purchasing?power?parities?and?the?national?GHG?
emission? level? per? capita.?The? results? support? the? idea? that?wealthier? countries? show?more?




Controlling? for? these? factors? allows? estimating? conditional? effects? of? cabinet? parties’?
interests?and?institutional?factors?which?are?interpreted?as?economically?independent?national?
capacities.?The?analyses?reveal?no?significant?effect?for?the?cabinets’?interest?in?environmental?
protection? on? the? number? of? climate? policy? instruments? implemented? in? the? country.? Two?
reasons?may?explain? this? finding.?First,?since? the? interest? in?environmental?protection?of? the?
cabinet? parties? is? measured? by? only? one? indicator,? it? is? very? difficult? to? capture? the?
multidimensional? spectrum? of? the? overall? concept? of? environmental? politics? as? it?may? be?




applied? in? this? research?paper.?Second,? looking?at? the?development?of? this? issue? in? the?party?
manifestos? over? time,? even? green? parties? reduce? their? emphasis? on? environmental? issues? in?
order? to?broaden? their?perspective? for?other?political? topics?and?address?a?greater?variety?of?
voters.? Since? the? overall? number? of? climate? policies? which? are? implemented? in? one? year?
increases?over?time,?the?most?positive?effect?of?environmentally?concerned?cabinets?in?the?early?





competition? to?other? issues? like,? for?example,? social? (financial)? security?and?unemployment.?
Thus,? political? parties?might? be? of? greater? awareness? of? the?more? specific? issue? of? climate?













economically? left? cabinets?on? the?number?of? climate?policies? since? the? separated?analysis?of?
economical? and? non?economical? issues? confirm? a? positive? and? significant? influence? of?
economically? left? cabinets? (p? <? 0.01)? but? not? for? non?economically? ones.? Thus,? it? is? the?
importance? of? issues?with? an? emphasis? on? economics? and? how? they? are? addressed? by? the?
national?cabinets?which?makes?the?difference?in?the?number?of?implemented?climate?policies.?
Independently? from? the? cabinets’? preferences? for? left? or? right? policies,? political?
institutions? and? access? points? to? the? political? systems? in? form? of? veto? players? show? the?
expected?positive?effects.?Looking?at?the?executive?disproportionality?index,?consensus?oriented?
democracies?provide?significantly?more?climate?policy?instruments?than?majoritarian?states?(p?
<? 0.10).?This? result? confirms? the? assumption? that? higher? numbers? of? access? points? into? the?
political? system? enables? general? interests? in? climate? policies? and? environmental? issues? to?
counter?balance?existing?and?powerful?business? lobbies.? In?contrast,? the?veto?player? index?of?
Lijphart?(1999)?does?not?reveal?a?significant?effect?(p?>?0.10).?One?reason?for?that?result?is?that?
the?significant?positive? influence?of?the?veto?player? index?of?Tsebelis? is?highly?correlated?with?








The? second? step?of? the?analysis? is?going?beyond? the?effort?of?EU?Member?States? to?mitigate?
climate? change? measured? in? numbers? of? climate? policy? instrument.? It? provides? an?
understanding?of?differences? in? the?character?of?national?policy?strategies?across? the?country?
sample.?This?preliminary?draft?version?only?takes?the?first?step?of?this?analysis.?Country?clusters?
characterizing? specific? patterns? of? climate? policy? strategies? among? EU?Member? States? are?
investigated? via? cluster? analysis.?A? second? step? uses? these? clusters? and? applies?multinomial?
regression?analysis?in?order?to?test?for?effects?of?the?welfare?state,?national?styles?of?regulation,?





whereas?public? investment?and?tradable?permits?are? least? likely? found.?Further? investigation,?
therefore,? focuses? on? differences? of? the? countries? compared?within? each? policy? instrument.?
Table?3?shows?the?separate?cluster?solutions?for?2005?and?2008?respectively.?The?table?indicates?
the?focus?on?specific?climate?policy?instruments?for?each?country?in?relation?to?other?states?(see?
also?Appendix? 1?and?Appendix?2).?A?country?cluster?has?a? strong? focus?on?a? specific?climate?
policy? category? if? the? cluster? implements? about? two? times? more? climate? policies? of? this?
category?than?the?cluster?with?a?medium?emphasis?and?three?times?more?climate?policies?than?
the? cluster?with? a? weak? emphasis? on? this? policy? instrument.? Applying? both? recommended?
stopping? rules? of? Calinski/Harabasz? pseudo?F? index? and? Duda/Hart? Je(2)/Je(1)? index,? the?
analysis?reveals?five?country?clusters?for?2005?and?six?country?groups?for?2008.?The?increasing?
number?of?clusters?from?2005?to?2008?is?quite?intuitive?given?the?fact?that?EU?Member?States?
have? to? follow? binding? regulations? by? the? EU? ESD? and,? therefore,? increasingly? implement?
climate? policies.? Since? a? single? policy? instrument,? like,? for? example,? public? regulation,? is?
limited?in?its?mitigation?effect?and?scope,?I?expect?higher?variation?in?policy?measures?within?a?
country?to?follow?higher?numbers?in?overall?climate?policies.?
Apart? from?changes? in? the?country?selection?within? the?clusters,? two?basic?effects?are?
suggested?by?the?results.?One?dimension?demonstrates?differences? in?overall? levels?of?climate?
mitigation?policies.?Thus,?the? first?cluster? includes?countries?which?are?characterized?by?very?










the? criteria?of? the?EU?Climate? and?Energy?Package? and? the?Kyoto?Protocol.?However,? some?
countries?develop?slower?than?others?(compare?for?example?Spain,?which?has?a?rather?late?but?
fast?development,?and?Poland,?which?displays? slowly? increasing? levels?of?climate?policies)?or?
even?remain?with?the?same?level?of?climate?policies?(e.g.?Luxembourg).?The?same?effect?can?be?
found? in? the? two? top?clusters.? United? Kingdom? and? Sweden? are? equally? well? prepared? to?
mitigate? climate? change? through? climate? policies? in? nearly? all? categories? in? 2005.? Sweden,?







The? second? dimension? outlined? in? Table? 3? is? differences? in? the? character? of? chosen?
mitigation?instruments?between?clusters.?One?finding?reveals?the?minor?importance?of?public?
investments? in? the?United?Kingdom?which?clearly? supports? the? liberal?understanding?of? the?
role? of? the? state? to?be? limited? to? framework?policy.? In? contrast,? the? second? cluster? in? 2008?
characterizes?a?group?of?countries?which? follow?an?understanding?of?a?strong?state?with?high?
levels? of? public? investments,? incentive? strategies,? regulatory? instruments? and? voluntary?
agreements,?but?only?weak?market?based? instruments? like? financial? and? tradable?permits.?A?
very?interesting?case?is?Germany?which?belonged?to?this?cluster?and?was?also?characterized?by?
very? high? levels? of? public? investments? in? 2005,? but? dramatically? reduced? its? effort? in? this?
category? until? 2008.? One? explanation? for? this? change? might? be? the? political? shift? in?
governmental? power? from? the? Social? Democrats/Green? coalition? to? a? cabinet? of? Social?
Democrats? and? the?Christian?Democrats? in? 2005.?The?new? cluster?of?Germany,?Austria? and?
Ireland? in? 2008? can?be? interpreted? as? a? strong? but? parsimonious? state? since? these? countries?
concentrate? on? incentives? and? subsidy?based? approaches,? political? processes? and? public?
regulation? in? major.? The? opposite? case? is? demonstrated? by? a? rather? new? cluster? of? the?
Netherlands?and?Sweden.?Since?Sweden?was?not?able?to?follow?up?the?dramatic?development?of?






Given? the? fact? that? these? countries? belong? to? the? Social?Democratic?welfare? regime?which?
basically? finances?social?benefits?through?tax?redistribution?(Esping?Andersen?1990),? financial?
instruments? in? the? field?of? social?policy?may? serve? as? standard?of? good?practice? in?order? to?
reach? both? social? goals? of? GHG? emission? reduction? and? provision? of? public? welfare.?
Additionally,?since?the?tax?system?is?very?much?developed,?these?countries?have?strong?means?
and?personnel?capacities?in?knowledge?and?experience?in?order?to?effectively?influence?national?
GHG? mitigation? levels? through? regulations? on? taxes.? Furthermore,? the? Netherlands? and?
Sweden? are? prototypes? of? the? business?coordinated? market? economies? with? considerable?
nonmarket?coordination.?They?are?characterized?by?strong?cooperation?(directly?or?indirectly)?
between? companies,? incorporated? labor? interests? and? the? framework? policy? of? the? state.?








This? paper? provides? a? first? attempt? to? specify? theoretically? and? measure? empirically? the?
influence? of? national? institutional? and? partisan? capacity? on? the? number? of? climate? policies.?
Following? power?resource? theory,? general? interests? in? environmental? protection? are? most?
successfully?implemented?into?climate?policies?if?they?are?represented?by?political?parties.?The?
more?the?political?parties’?emphasis?of?environmental?issues?in?their?party?manifesto?is?and?the?
stronger? their? electoral? support? is,? the? higher? is? the? likelihood? that? climate? policies? are?
implemented.?However,?this?interest?representation?is?expected?to?be?mediated?by?the?number?
and? character? of? access? points? to? the? political? system? (Eckersley? 2005;? Lijphart? 1984;? 1999;?
Tsebelis? 1995;? 1999;? 2004;? 2002).? It? is? demonstrated,? that? economically? left? cabinets? indeed?
influence? the? number? of? climate? policies? more? than? economically? right? cabinets.?
Unfortunately,? no? effect? is? found? for? the? environmental? orientation? of? the? cabinet.? Thus,?
cabinets? that? emphasize? environmental? protection? do? not? implement?more? climate? policies?
than?cabinets? in?which?environmental? issues?are? less? represented? in?party?manifestos.?Given?
the? fact? that?data?on? the?environmental?dimension? is? scarce?and? the? topic?of?environmental?
protection?might?constitute?a?valence?issue?in?one?country?but?a?position?issue?in?another?state,?
the?postulated?influence?of?political?environmental?orientation?remains?uncovered?and?asks?for?
further? investigation.? The? results? of? the? time?series? analyses? also? provide? support? for? the?








countries? indeed? differ? in? their? national? strategies? and? preferences? for? climate? policy?
instruments.?Comparing?country?groups?of?2005?with?2008,?differences?in?the?development?of?
but? also? in? the? preferences? for? very? specific? combinations? of? climate? policies? suggest? the?
existence? and? importance? of? national? specific? capacity? resources,? given? the? fact? that? these?
preferences? are? similar? to? other? institutional? structures? and? pathways?within? the? countries.?
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? Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4? Model?5? Model?6? Model?7? Model?8? Model?9? Model?10?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
GDP?(in?1000?Eur)? 0.05***? 0.06***? 0.05***? 0.06***? 0.06***? 0.04***? 0.04***? 0.04***? 0.04***? 0.04***?
(0.00)? (0.00)? (0.00)? (0.00)? (0.00)? (0.00)? (0.00)? (0.00)? (0.00)? (0.00)?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
GHG?emissions?per?
capita?
?0.07*****? ?0.07****? ?0.06***? ?0.08***? ?0.07***? ?0.04***? ?0.05***? ?0.04***? ?0.05***? ?0.04***?
(0.04)? (0.04)? (0.03)? (0.03)? (0.04)? (0.01)? (0.01)? (0.01)? (0.02)? (0.01)?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Environmental?
cabinet?
? 0.05***? 0.04***? 0.04***? 0.05***? ? ?0.00***? ?0.01***? ?0.01***? ?0.00***?
? (0.04)? (0.04)? (0.03)? (0.03)? ? (0.02)? (0.02)? (0.02)? (0.02)?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Left?cabinet? ? 0.15***? ? ? ? ? 0.09***? ? ? ?
? ? (0.12)? ? ? ? ? (0.04)? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Economically?left?
cabinet?
? ? 0.13***? 0.17***? 0.16***? ? ? 0.11***? 0.12***? 0.12***?
? ? (0.06)? (0.05)? (0.06)? ? ? (0.02)? (0.02)? (0.02)?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Non?economically?
left?cabinet?
? ? ?0.03***? ?0.05***? ?0.04***? ? ? ?0.07***? ?0.06***? ?0.06***?
? ? (0.11)? (0.09)? (0.09)? ? ? (0.04)? (0.04)? (0.05)?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Executive?
disproportionality?
? ? ? 0.09***? ? ? ? ? 0.06***? ?
? ? ? (0.05)? ? ? ? ? (0.02)? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Veto?player?index?
(Lijphart)?
? ? ? 0.05***? ? ? ? ? ?0.02***? ?
? ? ? (0.06)? ? ? ? ? (0.05)? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Veto?player?index?
(Tsebelius)?
? ? ? ? 0.10**? ? ? ? ? 0.05**?
? ? ? ? (0.04)? ? ? ? ? (0.02)?























? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
UK,?SE? Strong? strong? strong? strong? Medium? strong? strong? strong? medium?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
BE,?DE,?IT? Strong? weak? strong? strong? Strong? medium? strong? weak? medium?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
DK,?FI,?NL? Strong? medium? weak? strong? Weak? weak? medium? weak? strong?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
AT,?CZ,?FR,?IR,?LU? Medium? Weak? medium? medium? Weak? medium? weak? weak? weak?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
ES,?GR,?HU,?PL,?PT,?SK,?SL? Weak? Weak? weak? weak? Weak? weak? weak? weak? weak?
2008? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
UK? Strong? strong? strong? strong? Medium? strong? strong? strong? strong?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
ES,?BE,?FI,?FR,?IT? Medium? weak? strong? medium? Strong? weak? strong? weak? strong?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
NL,?SE? Medium? strong? medium? medium? Weak? weak? weak? weak? strong?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
AT,?DE,?IR? Medium? weak? strong? strong? Weak? medium? medium? weak? weak?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
CZ,?DK,?PT,?SK? Weak? weak? weak? weak? Weak? weak? weak? weak? weak?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
GR,?HU,?LU,?PL,?SL? Weak? weak? weak? weak? Weak? weak? weak? weak? weak?
Source:?International?Energy?Agency?2010?
Note:?Malta,?Cyprus,?Estonia,?Latvia,?Lithuania,?Bulgaria,?Romania?are?excluded?from?the?analysis?due?to?the?lack?in?climate?policies?
André?Schaffrin?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????The?Climate?Friendly?Welfare?State??
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